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A RECIPROCAL WELFARE PROGRAM

AmyL. Wax*

I. INTRODUCTION

What do people owe one another? The difficulties inherent in
answering this question reveal that reciprocity is a problematic
concept with an uneasy place in political theory and social practice. 1 Developing a normative theory of reciprocal social relations
is one part of the larger project of describing a just society. Like
that project, it is rife with problems of definition and justification.
These puzzles find reflection in the practical uncertainties that
arise in designing and maintaining the kinds of cooperative social
systems in which reciprocal relationships hold a central place.
The purpose of this essay is to explore in a preliminary way
what it would mean to adopt reciprocity as the central, unifying
principle of social welfare policy in a liberal democratic society.
The theory and practice of reciprocity are potentially important to
the design and political stability of centrally orchestrated, bureaucratic systems of redistribution that have been adopted in Western
capitalist societies over the past 100 years or so. The welfare state
serves to protect against misfortune, mitigate predictable disability, and smooth out the effects of free markets. The redistribution
of resources through governmentally mandated tax and benefits
programs can be viewed as a dynamic process of collecting resources from members of a group to create a common pool of assets. Resources from that pool are dispensed to other members of
the group for particular purposes under defined conditions. In
modern societies, these resources need not be generated, collected,
and reallocated through spontaneous, voluntary mechanisms of
* Class of 1948 Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia School
of Law.
1 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). See also Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices,
Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment 261-64 (1990) (stating that "[p]uzzles
abound in the theory of self-interested reciprocity."); Andrew Levine, Rethinking Liberal
Equality From a "Utopian" Point of View (1998).
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private association. Rather, that process can be accomplished
through the offices of a centralized authority that is established
through democratic assent.
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONDITIONAL RECIPROCITY
There is evidence that a powerful set of psychological responses governs people's attitudes towards the sharing of resources with others, including those less well off than themselves.
Specifically, it appears that in this context people are not always
motivated by straightforwardly selfish motives, as the conventional rational actor model would predict. They do not always act
exclusively from self-interest. In some settings, however, their
willingness to behave unselfishly appears contingent on similar
generosity from others, and they will punish those who seek to exploit or take advantage of them, even at some cost to themselves. 2
Some commentators have suggested that these behaviors are consistent with norms of reciprocity. 3 Those norms are often mediated
by powerful and elemental emotions or moral "sentiments" that
appear to be widespread and deeply ingrained features of human
psychology. 4
Although there is reason to believe that a concern with reciprocal obligations is widespread in human societies, there may well
be a disparity between social arrangements that command popular
assent and those that can be ethically justified on first principles.
Some liberal theorists who seek to formulate basic rules for the
2

See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs. 257.
266-68 (2000). For an exposition of the empirical psychology of reciprocal relations, see
Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,
14 J. Econ. Persp. 159, 159 (2000) (arguing that "[p]eople repay gifts and take revenge
even in interactions with complete strangers and even if it is costly for them and yields
neither present nor future material rewards.") (emphasis omitted); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gachter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 Am. Econ . Rev.
980, 980 (2000) (noting that "those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding,
even if this is costly to them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their
~unishment activities.").
See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passe? Homo Reciprocans and the
Future of Egalitarian Politics, Boston Rev., Dec.-Jan. 1999, at 4, 4. See also Robert H.
Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions 36 (1988); Stuart
White, Review Article: Social Rights and the Social Contract - Political Theory and the
New Welfare Politics, 30 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 507,513-14 (2000).
4
See Bowles & Gintis, supra note 3, at 4.
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composition of just societies do make some use of the concept of
reciprocity, although too often at a frustratingly high level of abstraction. John Rawls, for example, describes the just society as
one of reciprocal cooperation among equals. 5 He acknowledges
citizens' obligations "to contribute to joint enterprises from which
they have benefited and in which they are in some sense participants."6 David Gauthier is more explicit in refusing to recognize
collective obligations towards social actors who cannot participate
in voluntary exchange relationships. 7 Rawls' and Gauthier's contractarian approaches to justice have been criticized for failing to
find a place for those incapable of making the kinds of positive
contribution to the collective enterprise that might elicit a corresponding sense of obligation from others. How do those who are
less than fully capable of participating in a joint productive enterprise fit into a "just" scheme of reciprocal cooperation and exchange?8
An alternative line of attack on reciprocity as a governing
principle for social organization is grounded in an egalitarian critique of the concept of deservingness and "desert-based" allocations generally. 9 Any demand that individuals make some sacrifice
or positive contribution before resources will be forthcoming from
others or from the group necessarily generates a distinction between those who "deserve" public assistance and those who do
5

See Rex Martin, Rawls's New Theory of Justice, 69 Chi .-Kent L. Rev. 737, 750-51

~1994).

Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity 36I (I986).
See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement 268 (1986) (stating that " [a]nimals, the
unborn, the congenitally handicapped and defective, fall beyond the pale of a morality
tied to mutuality.").
8 See, e.g., Eva Feder Kittay, Love' s Labor: Essays on Women , Equality, and Dependency 76 (1999) (commenting on Rawls' s treatment of dependency); Martha Nu ssbaum,
Disabled Lives: Who Cares? N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. II, 2001, at 36 (noting Kittay ' s assertion that Rawls "explicitly omits from the situation of basic political choice the more
extreme forms of need and dependency that human beings may experience."); Allen Buchanan, Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice, 19 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 227,
232 (1990) (criticizing Gauthier's belief that moral rights "are rationally ascribable only
to potential contributors to social wealth."). But cf. Brian Barry, Theories of Justice 24446 (1989) (suggesting that Rawls's just society does recogr:ize obligations to the dependent and disabled).
9 For more on the concept of deservingness, see generally Richard J . Arneson , Egalitarianism and the Undeserving Poor, J. Pol. Phil. 327 (1997) (arguing that a proper theory of justice needs to take into account the norms of individual responsibility and deservi ngness).

7
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not. Yet, according to some theorists, the concept of "desert" is itself suspect, because the ability and willingness to contribute to
the social product , and the degree to which an individual is regarded as making a valuable contribution, depend ultimately on
arbitrary factors-such as individual endowments, patterns of consumer demand , and natural scarcities-for which individuals cannot justly be held responsible. 10 In addition, it has been maintained
that there is no consistent and universal yardstick for determining
just terms of exchange and no obviously correct rule for fi.xing the
amount and nature of contributions that warrant particular rewards
from others within a cooperative framework. 11 In the absence of
centralized direction, allocations of joint product are determined
by spontaneous bargaining within the group. But the outcome of
real life bargaining cannot provide the basis for answering the
normative question of which allocations are fair or comport with
defensible ethical principles. In the face of such wide variation in
terms of exchange and measures of social value, how can we know
what recompense for a particular effort or contribution is just?
The struggle to answer these questions is central to liberal political theory. John Rawls, for example, devotes a good deal of attention to them, but provides ambiguous answers. 12 On the one
hand he speaks of reciprocity as the bedrock of a just system. 13 On
the other, he attacks the notion that people "deserve" the economic
rewards they can earn within a free market, even when those rewards are the outgrowth of considerable effort. 14 He never expressly demands that social participants expend any kind of effort
as a condition of eligibility for social assistance, nor does he explicitly restrict the "least well off' class that is entitled to re10 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Eq!.!ality?, I 09 Ethics 287,
289-95 ( 1999) (discussing the range of views among "luck egalitarians" about the actions and consequences for which persons can fairly be held responsible); Samuel Scheffler, Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 965, 973-78 (2000) (discussing Rawls's views on desert) ; Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and
Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics, 21 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 299, 305-06 (1992) (same).
11
See, e.g. , Andrew Levine, Rewarding Effort, 7 J. Pol. Phil. 404, 409-11 (1999) (arguing that there is no feasible way to do the requisite moral accounting to justify income
inequalities).
12 See Rawls, supra note 1, at 310-15 (discussing "legitimate expectations and moral
desert").
l3 See id. at 311 (noting that a "just scheme ... answers to what men are entitled to; it
satisfies their legitimate expectations as founded upon social institutions").
14 See id. at 311-12.
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sources under his proposed rrummax or "difference principle"
scheme only to those who have at some time contributed, or attempted to contribute, to the social surplus. And, contrary to some
critiques, he never expressly excludes from help those who are
wholly incapable of contributing. 15 Indeed, the requirements of effort expended or positive contribution-in the form of past or prese nt work, for example-play very little role in Rawls's exposition
of the principles of justice, except perhaps in his concern with
equal opportunity. 16
Interestingly, ordinary people appear much more concerned
with the concrete questions that Rawls finesses. What is the nature
of the contribution expected from each member of a just society,
and under what conditions should it be forthcoming? To whom is
he lp owed from collective resources, and under what circumstances? Public opinion appears to have anticipated many of these
conceptual difficulties. 17
Popular attitudes have at least something to say on the problem
of defining the precise nature and magnitude of the contribution
that would entitle social actors to assistance from others, whether
through private channels or collectively through government.
There is robust suppmt for fundamental norms of self-reliance that
oblige able-bodied persons to work to support themselves and that
15
Cf. Kittay, supra note 8, at 76 (noting that Rawls has joined other authors "who
ha ve omitted responsibility for dependents from, or relegated it to the periphery of, the
political."). See also Barry, supra note 8, at 243-44 (suggesting that the disabled and the
dependent would certainly be included in the class of the "less-well-off').
l6 For a more extensive discussion, see Amy L. Wax, Something for Nothing: the Liberal Case Again st Welfare Work Require ments (preliminary draft on file with author).
See also, e.g., Edmund Phelps, Delivering a Basic Income, Boston Rev., Oct.-Nov.
2000, at 12. Rawls derives the "maximin" principle, which is concerned primarily with
the redi stribution of "primary social goods," after he establishes a set of fundamental
principles of individual rights, which include the right to seek to attain gainful positions
open to all. See Rawls , supra note l, at 83-90, 150-61. But Phelps notes th at Rawls says
little about what happens to those who neither seek nor obtain employment. See Phelps,
supra. However, in later work Rawls implies that, because leisure is a primary good,
those who are voluntarily idle would probably not qualify as among the least well off
because they would be endowed with an ample measure of society's resources by virtue
of their plethora of free time. See Phillippe Van Parijs, Why Should Surfers Be Fed: The
Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 101, 101 (1991)
(citing John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
257 n.7 (1988)).
17 For more details regarding popular views of welfare and redi stributive programs,
see Wax, supra note 2, at 271-74.
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charge those who receive public assistance with the dut y to respond in kind by making (or having at so me point made) contributions. That principle is grounded in an abhorrence of free-riding ,
which can be defined, albeit crudely, as receiv in g benefits without
contributing enough in return. But popular opinion do es not view
unvarnished reciprocity as a complete theory of soc ial relations.
Rather, the duty to contribute accrues only to th ose who are capable of contributing. 18 Mo st people thus reject a narrow view of
reciprocity that demands actual contribution as the price fo r cooperation and ass istance in favor of a code of economic redistribution that embraces a broader notion of conditional reciprocity.
The principle of conditional reciprocity addresses head on the
problem of individuals who , by virtue of their meager abilities or
incapac ities, are not invited to participate in voluntary economic
exchanges and can make no net contribution to the social surplus.
It also has something to say about the vexed question of the terms
of exchange by suggesting what might count as a sufficient contribution to wan·ant an entitlement to public resources and collective
support. The short answer on both counts-albeit one requiring
further elaboration for real world application in myriad circumstances-is that the duty to contribute attaches only to those who
are able to expend productive effort, and only to a degree that is
reasonable in light of the person' s abilities and endowments as
well as social practices and conventions relating to work. There is
a general consensus that the disabled, the young, and many of the
elderly are entitled to at least partial support from the public because they are dependent through no fault of their own. 19 Individuals not falling into these categories must ordinarily abide by
the conventional expectation of full-time effort in the labor market. In other words, everyone else is expected to work for a living
unless they have a special reason to be exempted. This expectation
is consonant with widespread popular support for the moralistic
distinction between deserving and undeserving recipients of public
aid, with "desert" determined by whether someone contributes as
much to his own economic support as he reasonably can. Voluntary noncompliance with these expectations defeats entitlement to
18

See id. at 268-69.
See id. at 270-71. Attitudes toward the elderl y carry some nu a nce. Despite the ability of some elderly peopl e to support themselves through work, they are generally
viewed as entitled to a peri od of rest after a prolonged lifetime of labor.
19
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public help. Involuntary noncompliance preserves it.
I have speculated elsewhere that the widespread unwillingness
to assist individuals viewed as depending unnecessarily on public
reso urces represents a modern expression of innate or learned psychological attitudes with widespread currency across human societies. 20 Those attitudes evolved to help facilitate the development of systems of reciprocal aiel during remote periods of human
history. I spec ulate that evolution favored individuals able to form
stable " insurance" collectives designed to assist community members in times of emergency or distress. In the absence of a centralized authority to collect resources from the group by force, the
stability and cohesion of such arrangements would tend to depend
on a strong norm of reciprocity that demanded contributions from
able-bodied citizens, reserved aid only to victims of bad luck, and
punished opportunism. This account rests on the assumption that
participating in successful collectives of this type, although ultimately more beneficial to some members than others, actuarially
enhanced the "fitness" of all members of the group. 21 On this assumption, the model predicts that evolutionary pressures would
favor the development and retention of the moral sentiments
needed to sustain the cohesive norms upon which these arrangements depend, including a strong antipathy to "freeloaders." The
theory is that the desirability of erecting systems for mutual support against misfortune, and the need to guard against freeloaders
that threaten to undermine the stability of such ventures, has led to
the development of an ethos of conditional reciprocity that incorporates a strong antipathy to those who depend unnecessarily on
public support and that sharply distinguishes between those who
can pay their own way and those who are afflicted with incapacities or special needs that require them to depend on others for
sustenance.
This distinction, although fairly precise in the abstract, leaves
many issues unresolved in practice. As noted, conditional reciSee id. at 266-67.
Although this assumption may hold on a straightforward individual fitness paradi gm, it almost certainly makes more sense to analyze these arrangements using more
sophi sti cated models of group fitness, or group-enhancing altruistic behavior. See generall y Elli ott Sober & David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of
Unselfish Behavior ( 1998) (theorizing that the development of certain altruistic behaviors serves an evo lutionary purpose, consistent with Darwin's idea of group selection).

20
21
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procity does dictate a fairly definite stance towards the profoundly
disabled and the abjectly dependent by recognizing clear collective
obligations to those who, through no fault of their own, will never
be able to generate any significant resources for themselves. By
attaching the condition of involuntariness, an ethos built on the
distinction between the deserving and undeserving finds a place
for those who would appear to be outside the circle of cooperation
and exchange without giving up on the core universal obligation to
contribute to others' well-being or to joint social product that lies
at the heart of the concept of reciprocity. But establishing the understanding that conditional reciprocity does not require a positive
contribution from everyone-and accepting that certain persons
will be dependent on the rest of us at the extremes-does not come
close to resolving many key questions that might arise about what
a system built on conditional reciprocity does affirmatively require. The terms in which a principle of conditional reciprocity is
expressed, both by ordinary people and by sophisticated theorists,
are inherently ambiguous~ 2 The precept that people should work if
they are able and make contributions if they can begs many questions about how to define "work" and about what qualifies as
"making a contribution." Specifically, do we adopt a notion of
work that looks to the effort the worker expends, the "disutili ty" or
unpleasantness he suffers, the sacrifice he makes, or the value or
benefit he produces for others? 23 The answers are complicated by
the fact that the ability to work or work productively is not a matter of all or nothing. There is also the question of how much
weight to place on market measures of value in preference to nonmarket-based criteria. A person might be able to engage in effortful or productive activity, but be unable to perform a job available
in the paid economy. He may not be able to command a sufficient
reward on the paid labor market to support himself and his dependents, or he may engage exclusively in activities that are normally performed outside the market (such as family care and domestic work). Alternatively, a person may elect to "work" (in the
22 See. e.g., William A. Galston, What About Reciprocity?, Boston Rev., Oct.-Nov.
2000, at 9 (defining reciprocity as "the simple but profound idea that people who receive
benefits should make contributions-if they are able.").
2 3 See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility
89-90 (1970) (suggesting that income may be deserved as a social recognition of excellence or achievement, or as gratitude for contributions made to the economic welfare or
"standard of living").
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sense of expending positive effort), but not in a way that appears
to benefit others or that produces what others value. Consider, for
example, the third rate ar1ist who chooses to spend all day in his
garage laboring mightily over paintings that no one wants. How
does conditional reciprocity deal with these situations? 24
Addressing these situations is essential to putting reciprocal insights to work in designing programs for the real world. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to such real world programs.
It will critically examine features of the American social welfare
system, and especially recent reforms introduced by the enactment
of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act 25,
in light of the principles of conditional reciprocity articulated
above. The essay will argue that, although the policies in place go
some distance towards vindicating reciprocity principles, more
could be done to square the system with these ideals. The government should provide more generous work subsidies for low-wage
workers and better care for children of the working poor. While
retaining work requirements, it should deliberately modify those
requirements to accommodate the demands of parenthood. It
should extend the five-year lifetime limit on welfare payments for
selected recipients while continuing to make public support conditional on performing work of some kind, including, as a last resort,
publicly created "workfare" type jobs. It should modify preexisting in-kind benefits programs that provide housing and food
assistance more explicitly to favor workers over non-workers. It
should stress and expand funding for flexible and creative programs like transportation loans, "supported work" assistance, and
short-term emergency relief, which help workers obtain and keep
their jobs. Finally, it should establish minimally adequate health
benefits for employees and their families.
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF A RECIPROCAL WELFARE
SYSTEM
The fundamental idea behind a reciprocity-based welfare system is that assistance is owed to those who contribute if they are
able and to those who fail to contribute if they are not. Because
people differ widely in their capacity for self-sufficiency-and be24

25

For more on these issues, see Wax, supra note 16.
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 110, 110 Stat. 2l 05 ( 1996).
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cause many low-wage workers earn too little to support themselves-this principle amounts to recognizing the community's
duty to make up any shortfall between what persons can command
on their own in the market or through private anangements and an
amount sufficient to support a minimally decent standard of living.
In effect the government undertakes to act as surety for a basic
standard of living on condition the that "insured" make a reasonable effort to contribute to their own self-support through some
kind of work or through an alliance with someone who agrees to
provide support.
As noted, the rule as stated tracks the traditional distinction
between the deserving and undeserving poor without resolving all
questions about who deserves assistance and how much. The centerpiece of such a system must be welfare work requirements for
the "able-bodied"-that is, for those who are capable of performing tasks in the paid economy. But this definition suggests an immediate line of attack: If there are just not enough jobs to go
around, then is it not unfair to throw everyone who is not working
off the welfare rolls or to hold everyone to the demand for work as
a condition of receiving benefits? And even if there are jobs available, what if many do not quality for those jobs due to inadequate
training and education or lack of talent? Finally, what about mothers of small children? Do they belong in the category of the "ablebodied?" Are they not "working" enough to discharge their obligations to the collective? Decisions about how to structure actual
benefits programs require some resolution of these questions.
A. Structural Unemployment

The first objection based on structural unemployment is indeed
weighty even within the terms of the reciprocity paradigm itself.
But it does not follow from the existence of some residual unemployment in the economy that work requirements should be abolished. As long as there is reason to believe that many persons on
welfare really could do more to support themselves, work requirements can be used to vindicate reciprocity principles. The job
market under welfare reform functions like a game of musical
chairs: as recipients scramble to comply with new demands by
seeking employment, more and more obtain jobs and more jobs
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are filled. 26 By hypothesis, a few people will eventually end up
without jobs, but it is impossible to know who those people will be
at the outset of the game. Imposing meaningful work requirements, after decades of failure to do so, starts the music. Only after
many rounds are played and all seats are filled will it become clear
which players are left standing. The problem is that the reformist
pressures that cause the game to be played in earnest seem essential to sorting this out. The "undeserving" cannot be effectively
wrung from the system without playing a game that can only end
with some unfortunate stragglers left seat-less. Those stragglers
cannot be regarded as "undeserving" in the sense that smneone
must be left behind. The paradox is that, as the process accomplishes its purpose, the system becomes less and less fair to the
" hard core" of those remaining. This suggests that, depending on
economic background conditions, welfare work requirements, although consistent with reciprocity norms up to a point, may stand
in tension with them over time. When we arrive at the point that
the only people left on the rolls are those who, despite repeated
threats of loss of benefits and apparent good faith efforts, are still
not complying with work requirements, it will become increasingly difficult to maintain those requirements for all seemingly
"able-bodied" individuals. The poor relief provisions of the welfare reform statute, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
("TANF"), 27 do permit states to exempt up to one-fifth of their
caseloads from work requirements 28 and, in the cases of "hardship" or domestic violence, from the 5-year lifetime limit on federally funded benefits. 29 States are not required to make use of
these safety-valve exemptions, and only some have invoked them
for work requirements. Because lifetime limits on benefits are yet
to kick in for most states, it remains to be seen whether and how
states will elect to take advantage of the 20% rule for time limits
by exempting their most recalcitrant, resistant, or unfortunate
cases. If some core of the welfare caseload, despite reasonable efforts, seems unable to obtain and hold a job for any sustained pe26 See Robert Pear, Far More Single Mothers Are Taking Jobs, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5,
2000, § 1, at 28.
27
For a good overview of the features of the T ANF block grant, see Helen Hershkoff
& Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor: The Authmitative ACLU Guide to Poor
Peop le 's Rights 32-54 (1997).
"l8
~
~
See Wax , supra note 2, at 286.
29 Sec 42 U.S.C. §608(a)(7) (1998).
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riod, it can be argued that the conditional reciprocit y norm requires that some provision be made for those individu als by exempting them from strict time limits. Maintaining the integrity of
the reciprocity ideal requires that the exempt population consist
only of tho se who are truly unable to work despite best efforts.
The task of insuring that the exempt "deserve" their exemption
will always be difficult and prone to enor. Thus, although such
exemptions may be necessary, their existence will always threaten
to undermine the credibility of any work-based scheme, both for
taxpayers who fund welfare and for recipients who must decide
how seriously to take its requirements.
B. Time Limits on Welfare Benefits

One possible solution to the time-limits problem would be to
permit states to "stop the clock" on the five- year federal lifetime
limit while individuals are working and receiving benefits simultaneously, as often occurs under generous state earnings ' disregard
rules. 30 This suggestion is appealing from the point of view of
reciprocity: individuals who exert a reasonable effort within the
workplace are by definition fulfilling the requirements of a conditionally reciprocal scheme. The quid pro quo for that effort is
enough support from the government to bring the person up to a
minimally decent standard of living. The support could take the
form of a cash welfare check or "subsidy," suitably calibrated to
reflect the person's own work contribution. The payment would
continue indefinitely as long as the person was in need despite
putting in a substantial work effort. In effect, the five-year lifetime
limit on "welfare" would only apply to money received while the
beneficiary was not complying adequately with some kind of welfare work requirement. Compliance would establish a reciprocal
basis for some kind of ongoing assistance. 3 1
One problem with this proposal is that it effectively seeks to
establish a permanent subsidized or supported work regime for
former welfare beneficiaries. But people who are trying to satisfy
30 See Dan Bloom and Robert Rector, Remarks at the New World of Welfare Conference, sponsored by the Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michi gan in W ashington, D. C. (Feb. 1-2, 2001) (conference notes on file with author) .
3 1 Alternatively, states could effectively stop the federal clock during peri ods of subs idized work by usin g state funds to support welfare- to-work transitions.
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welfare work requirements or leave welfare altogether are not the
only ones in need of income supports. Some persons who have
never been on welfare earn just as little as those who are making
the transition from welfare to work, and it is unfair to subsidize the
latter indefinitely by tolling the clock on welfare time limits, while
ignoring those who cannot take advantage of welfare-based work
subsidies because they have never so ught ass istance. The so lution
to this problem is to establish a unified scheme that draws in everyone who makes an inadequate income despite something like
full-time work effort. Consistency sugge sts that we should either
expand welfare to allow everyone with a substandard wage to join
the welfare-as-perpetual-work-subsidy bandwagon, or we should
continue to view welfare-plus-work as a limited, transitional stopgap and create non-welfare based, comprehensive, supported work
programs, such as a negative income tax or a wage subsid y, which
are designed to boost the earnings of the lowest wage workers
over the long haul.

C. Lack of Job Skills
The discussion so far prompts a closer examination of the
question of what it means to be "unable" to work. Does it mean
that one cannot get hired in the current environment, or that one
lacks and is unable to obtain the skills necessary to get hired? A
related objection to work requirements and time-limits-that many
of the nonworking poor, although seemingly capable of performing productive tasks, just will not be hired into the jobs employers
need doing-requires a more complex analysis within the reciprocity framework. One way of looking at this problem is as a
variation on the theme of structural unemployment, but with an
emphasis on worker-job mismatch rather than just the sheer lack
of enough jobs to put everyone to work. But this raises the question of why this mismatch exists. Why do some jobs go begging
when there is a residual army of unemployed? Can individuals be
held responsible for this, or is it a fact beyond their control? Much
depends on how we define "able-bodied." Persons without obvious physical or mental disabilities seem capable of engaging in
some kind of productive activity-that is, they would appear to be
able to create economic value by dint of exerting some effort. Although persons may seem perfectly capable of performing some
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so rt of productive task, that does not mean they are equipped to
"prod uce" on the job market as it actually exists . This discussion
shows that terms like "productivity" and "able-bodied" are ambiguous. These terms can be used to refer to the capacity to generate gross output without regard to the costs of producing that output. or to net output of work taking into account the cost of
mak ing that work po ss ible. Alternativel y, they can refer to output
and effort without regard to whether the products benefit anyone
e lse . Some people's effo rt s do not yield much of value or not
enough to make it economically feasible to employ the m in actual
jobs at mandated levels of compensation. Some may not be worth
emp loyin g at any level of compensation. 32 This may be due to lack
of abilit y, intellectual or otherwise, or for reasons related to a
worker 's character, habit s, demeanor, or behav ior. Intellect and
other forms of raw ability can be regarded as fixed endowments
for which individuals are not responsible, but they can also be
viewed as attributes that are developed, up to a point, through effort and wise choices. On the former view, persons who cannot fill
available jobs because of personal deficiencies should arguably be
treated the same as tho se who are "disabled" in more familiar
ways. In other words, low ability should be assimilated to "disability." Our resistance to such an equation may relate to the difficulty of distinguishing low ability from the consequences of the
individual' s past or present failure to develop whatever potential
abilities he or she possesses. It is always po ssible to ask whether
someone is "unable" to do a particular job--or any available job-because of raw and ineluctable defects in talent or intellect, or because of the "voluntary" failure to develop potential in ways that
would enhance employability. The response to this difficulty and
the moral hazard it creates is to refuse, at least formally, to excuse
those with " mere" incompetence from contributing through work
unless their deficits are extreme to the point of representing a welldefined and medically recognized syndrome, such as mental retardation or a psychiatric disease.
32 Under ideal neoclassical theory, the wages offered to low-productivity workers
should sink to retlect their value to the employer. There are many reasons, however, why
this might not happen , or why low-producti vity workers mi ght not enter the labor market
eve n if wages were lowered- reasons that stem from labor market deviations from the
ideal and from the distorti ons introduced by government regul ati on. On the probl e ms of
low-wage labor markets, see Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and Self-Support to Free Enterprise 16-48 ( 1997).
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D. Single j\;fo th erhood

Yet another difficulty confronting a reciproc al welfare sys tem
co nc erns the expectations for tho se who exert their efforts o ut side
the paid economy-especially mo thers of minor children and sing le mothers with no reliable so urce of private suppol1 . The treatment of mothers under a system governed by princ iples of conditional reciprocity is extreme ly complex. There are seve ral iss ues
that need to be resolved in deciding whether or to what extent
recip roc it y principles demand that mothers work in the paid eco no my, that they provide all or most of the suppot1 for themse lves
and their children, or that they be viewed as e ntitled to substantia l
o r complete assistance from society as a whole. The fir st issue is
the extent to which women 's effort as mothers, albeit exerted outside the paid labor market , should be regarded as discharging reasonable work requirements that trigger reciprocal obligations on
the part of society as a whole. Much has been written, especially
by feminist scholars, about society's obligation to support
women's caretaking function, 33 but the precise bas is of this obligation is unclear. To be sure, childrearing is "work" in the sense
that it requires the exertion of effort on the part of the caretaker
and confers some benefit on the child. But that does not answer
the question of whether society is obligated to pay full freight for
motherhood, or whether full-time mothers' obligations to exert
reasonable effort s towards self-support are to be regarded as discharged.
Support for single mothers is often justified by the assertion
that all of society benefits when women devote themselves to the
caretaking function. 34 In effect, society is only paying for what it
gets. But, as I have argued elsewhere, that rationale is not suffi33

See, e.g. , Shirley P. Burggraf, The Femj nine Economy and Economic Man: Revi ving the Role of F amily in the Post-Industrial Age, ix (1997) (noting European efforts to
miti gate childrearing cos ts with daycare subsidies or child allowances) ; Marth a Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family, a nd Other T wen tieth Century
Tragedies 9 (1995) (arguing that society fail s to value caretakers);Kittay, supra note 8, at
I (discussing the issue of "who provides the support for the relationsrup of care and for
both parties to the caring relationship") .
34 See Wax , supra note 2, at 278 (stating that child-rearing generates "public goods"
by producing "good citizens"); Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and
Taxing Wome n, 44 Viii. L. Rev. 495,513 ( 1999) (notin g that "children grow up to be
industrious, law-abiding, sober, moral, conscientious, creative, educated and skill ed cit ize ns. ") .
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cient to just ify an obligation of complete support for caretakers
and their children, because most of the efforts expended by parents
and caretakers redound to the benefit of private individu als-that
is, the parents themselves and the children. 35 The collective enjoys
only a small part of the payoff from reproductive and caretaking
work in the form of the public good of well-behaved, law abiding,
productive citizens. 36 These positive externalities, which are not
captured exclusively by the individual parents and children but are
shared by all, should by rights be compensated by the collective. 37
But that reaso ning justifies, at most, a modes t and partial subsidy
for child rearing. Considerations tied to the true "exchange value"
of the benefit received cannot justify society paying the full freight
for single mothers and their children. 38
But conditional reciprocity does not demand that the person
who is receiving help from the group actually return something in
kind that is equal to the value of collective support. On the contrary, it is assumed that so me will contribute more to the common
pool of reso urces than they receive and vice versa. The whole
point of the welfare system is to smooth out such differences by
insuring that those who are unable to provide enough for their own
needs are brought up to the baseline by the group, so long as they
comply with the requirement to make reasonable efforts to contribute to the social product. But on that view, how should the issue of single motherhood--or motherhood in general-be approached? Any attempt to answer this question must be made in
light of the understanding that the standard a society sets for a sufficient contribution to satisfy the requirements of conditional reciprocity cannot be completely arbitrary. Rather, the duty imposed
35 See Wax, supra note 2, at 278 (noting that a mother's childrearing efforts yi eld
"consumption value" to the parents and benefi t the child through "an altruistic gift of
care") ; Wax, supra note 33, at 514 (positing that parents' satisfaction in havi ng and raisin g children , and children's enjoyment of the fruits of their developed human capital ,
outweigh any bene fits of childrearing for third parties).
36 See Wax, supra note 33, at 513; AmyL. Wax, Is There a Caring Crisis?, 16 Yal e J.
on Reg. 327, 345 (1999) (reviewing Shirley P. Burggraf, The Feminine Economy and
Economic Man: Reviving the Role of the Family in the Postindustrial Age (2d ed. 1999).
37 But see Eric Rakowski , Equal Justice 153-54 (1991) (suggesting that society owes
no compen sation to parents for producing the next generation, because these benefits are
thrust on society unrequested).
38 See Wax , supra note 2, at 278 (arguing that "it seems unlikely th at the collecti ve
would come out ahead overall from underwriting the support for all single women with
ch ildren who choose to avail themselves of help. ").
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upon the "able-bodied" is to strive for self-sufficiency. But if a
person chooses an activity that causes her to fall shorter of that
goal than if she applied her efforts in a different direction, then society would do well to judge that effort insufficient. Surely a society is under no obligation to support a third-rate artist who chooses
to spend his days churning out paintings in his garage if those
paintings are of little value to anyone but the artist himself, as evidenced by the fact that no one wants to buy them. Perhaps the artist might be regarded as discharging his duty if the stream of thirdrate paintings is the best the artist could do, since conditional reciprocity demands only that someone contribute as much as he is
reasonably able. But most artists can do more to support themselves either by dividing their efforts between art and paid employment or by abandoning art altogether. In general, conditional
reciprocity does not recognize a collective obligation to support
members' decisions to engage in any work of their choosing if that
choice will make them dependent on group support and another
position available to them would not. It is true that almost everyone could work harder and generate more income than they already do. And there is no generally held expectation that people
make as much money as they can regardless of the effort or exertion involved. But there is no inconsistency in the demand that
people do more for themselves only up to a point, because the
group is naturally more concerned with those who seek public
subsidization than with those who do not. The rule appears to be
roughly that persons should strive for self-sufficiency if the effort
required is within the realm of reason, with the standard for reasonable exertion informed by conventional expectations and by
what most people do. And the customary expectation is to make
the most palatable of available choices that permits the attainment
of economic independence through reasonable efforts, even if the
person would really rather be doing something less lucrative.
Why might societies tend to adopt self-sufficiency as a strong
baseline norm? To apply a more lenient rule would invite everyone to choose the most desirable and pleasant form of employment
regardless of compensation on the expectation that the group
would make up the difference. But if everyone accepted that invitation, the difference could not be made up. Since insurance collectives must be at pains to avoid this destabilizing moral hazard,
it comes as no surprise that societies will regard with suspicion or
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even hostility anyone who seeks voluntarily to exempt himself
from the baseline expectation of economic self-support.
To summarize, although a strong dose of convention governs
the determination of what counts as enough exertion or contribution to give rise to a reciprocal obligation for ass istance if needed,
the conventions are always informed by the interests of the group.
The previous analysis suggests why self-sufficiency (that is, the
ge neration of enough resources to obviate the need for help from
the group) will always serve as a powerful normative baseline
from which deviations will be viewed with disfavor and will invite
scrutiny. Nonetheless, economic conditions and social custom will
always color the determination of whether enough etiort towards
the goal of self-sufficiency has been exerted in any given case. It
will matter how hard most people actually work within a given society at a particular time, which will in tum depend on how hard
most people have to work to attain independence. Thus, the willingness to help people in different populations and with different
characteristics may vary with time and circumstances.
The forgoing analysis sheds important light on the question of
public support for single mothers. Although the duty of selfsufficiency has always been the starting point, there was a time
when motherhood alone exempted a woman from that expectation.39 The reasons for that exemption were rooted in custom, law,
practice, and social organization. Women were viewed as inherently dependent and therefore no women were expected to be selfsupporting; all were the charge of some man. 40 If private dependency failed, the state took over. But those attitudes have changed
radically, and so have the conditions that went with them. The opportunities for women to generate significant resources in the labor market have greatly expanded, and economic independence is
now common among mothers and non-mothers alike. Indeed, today, many single and married mothers in all social classes either
support themselves or make significant efforts in the paid labor
market to contribute to their families' support. Those facts will inevitably affect society's attitudes towards assisting single mothers
39 See Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare 1890-1935, at 20 (1994) ; Mimi Abramovitz, Regulating the Lives of Women: Soci al
Welfare Poli cy from Colonial Times to the Present 3 (1988 ).
4 0 See Gordon, supra note 38, at 20; Abramovitz, supra note 38, at 52-54.

200 1]

A Reciprocal Welfare Program

495

with children. But that shift is not a mere arbitrary contingency.
Rather, it fo llows quite directly from the log ic of rec iprocity as it
applies to present economic reality. Under a reciprocity paradig m,
the change in expec tations for women and mothers in response to
social practice is essential to the maintenance of horizontal equity
and the discouragement of free riding, which are both central elements of a reciprocity-based structure. Within a cooperative group
that has pledged mutual support for all members on condition that
each person exert a reasonable effort on his own behalf, the fact
that certain people routinely attain self- sufficiency and do not request assistance will necessarily give rise to the ex pectation that
other similarly situated persons do the same. To permit those with
similar capacities to make very different contributions to selfsupport is to license the kind of mutual exploitation that violates
the fundamental reciprocity paradigm. That paradigm goes a long
way towards explaining the present uneasiness with allowing some
mothers to depend almost entirely on public support while others
with similar attributes succeed in maintaining greater independence.
But the explanation for the present unwilling ness to offer
comprehensive support for single mothers and families rests not
just on popular expectations about work and self- sufficiency. It
also stems from understandings about parenthood and reproduction in our society. The key distinction here is between choice and
chance: conditional reciprocity recognizes an entitlement to group
assistance if the need for help stems from events or forces beyond
the individual' s effective control. But that principle gives rise to a
series of questions. Is it fair to assume in most cases that becoming
a mother is a matter of choice rather than luck? If parenthood
should be viewed as a choice, and if having children makes it difficult to earn a living by interfering with work or by impeding
training for work, is that something for which society may fairly
hold a person responsible? And if so, does the attachment of responsibility entail a denial of public assistance to single mothers in
need? Questions of timing are often critical here. To put it more
precisely: recognizing that past choices to have children can defeat
present efforts at self-support, does the assignment of responsibility for those past choices require the denial of present public assistance, despite the potential recipient's current reasonable efforts?
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The long turning of the tide away from willingness to support
single parents goes hand-in-hand with a growing consensus that
the decision whether or not to become a mother is increasingly
under the individual s' control. Birth control and abortion have become safer, increasingly available, and more reliable. And more
and more women are actually exerting such control, as evidenced
by their decisions to delay or limit motherhood or to forgo motherhood entirely. Moreover, not only is there reason to believe that
choices in this area are often motivated by pragmatic concerns
such as lack of financial resources, the inability to provide proper
care due to competing obligations, or the paucity of familial supports, but taking these considerations into account is considered in
many quarters to be the socially responsible thing to do. Against a
set of background conventions and practices that recognize the
need for "hard choices" based on the ability to provide well for
children and that locate responsibility for reproductive decisions
increasingly with the individual, the request for public support as a
standing entitlement for parents becomes more and more difficult
to square with the idea of public assistance as insurance against
bad luck. It generates too much cognitive dissonance for society,
in allocating resources through redistributive social policy, to suspend the conventional understandings of responsibility for parenthood by attributing to chance what is viewed for most people as a
matter of choice.
It is interesting, however, that although single mothers have
increasingly been viewed as "responsible" for their predicament,
this has not resulted in the denial of all help to mothers either historically or under current welfare law. 41 As noted, the constraints
imposed by parental responsibilities may undermine the ability to
achieve self-support through paid work, despite reasonable efforts.
Parents will find it difficult to work long and irregular hours or to
engage in protracted periods of training. On a strict view of the
boundaries between individual and collective responsibility, the
public would have no duty to mitigate present disabilities or inequalities-including parental disadvantages on the labor marketthat are traceable to past choices with present uncorrectable conse41

See Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 26, at 33, 44-45, 49-50, 52 (noting that under
AFDC , benefits for poor unmarried mothers were guaranteed, while under T ANF, single
mothers may receive benefits if they meet certain eligibility requirements).
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quences .-+ 2 In allocating responsibility, why should timing matter?
Nonetheless, the political consensus today would appear to be
that this position regarding the present co nsequ e nces of past
choices is unduly harsh. As a practical matter, we seem willing to
assist single mothers even if the amount of help they need , or the
fact that the y need any help at all, is a function of unwise past
choices. And that willingness to disregard the past, and to look exclusively at present self-help efforts, extends beyond the case of
single mothers to others who have made earlier "mistakes" or imprudent decisions that have added to their present needs or to their
lesser currency on the job market. But a focus on the present and
future conduct of beneficiaries of assistance is not necessarily inco nsistent with principles of conditional reciprocity. Indeed, that
stance may in some cases be more consonant with the paradigms
of group cooperation.
E. The Role of Past Life Choices

Although reciprocal systems employ notions of responsibility,
luck, and agency, the goal is not to enshrine the distinction between choice and chance for its own sake or to invest it with talismanic significance divorced from real-world consequences.
Rather, the norm of reciprocity is best understood as emerging to
serve the instrumental goal of cementing cooperative arrangements for protecting group members from misfortune and temporary hard times. The pertinent question to ask in trying to understand how reciprocal norms operate is: how did these collective
arrangements arise and maintain themselves over time? The quest
is for rules that will appeal to people as conditional cooperatorsthat is, as persons who are willing to do their part so long as they
are assured that others will too. But, as game theorists who have
attempted to model reciprocal systems have suggested, stability of
cooperation does not necessarily depend on shutting out persons
42

See, e.g., Ronal d Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality
287-91 (2000) ("In principle .. .indi victuals should be relieved of consequential respon$bility for those unfortunate features of their situation that are brute bad luck, but not from
those that should be seen as t1 owing from their own choices.") ; Rakow ski, supra note 36,
at 73-87 (arguing that inequalities resulting from poor choices are morally unobjection able); Anderson, supra note 10, at 291 (describing how "luck egalitarians" believe in an
equality of opportunity conception of justice rather than an equality of outcome conception , thus accepting the inequ alities that may result from adults' voluntary choi ces) .
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forever after some temporary failure to co nfo rm to cooperati ve
expectations.-1 3 The practical require ments of a workable system of
co nditional rec iprocit y ca n sometimes be satisfi ed wit ho ut taking
suc h an inflexible view of responsibility. Models of reciproca l coope ration recognize that these arrangements play themse lves o ut
o n repeat rounds, in which the willingness of group me mbers to
cooperate with others often depends on an opposing player ' s mo st
immediate moves rather than on actions re mote in time.44 Someo ne who defects or ac ts irresponsibly at one point may change
co urse and dec ide to cooperate in the present or future. Players reserve the right to change their strategies, or players make mistakes.
If the goal is the widest possible productive participatio n in a co o perative ve nture, it may sometimes be wiser to incorpo rate opportunities fo r "second chances," "fresh starts," forgiveness , or redemption into the game than to adopt a rule of permane nt ejection
fo r past sins. Forgiveness may make sense, for example, if past infrac tions do not doom everyone to dependency forever. If past
norm violators retain the capacity to make positive contributions,
it may benefit the group to provide them with an ongoing opport unit y to demo nstrate their willingness to do so. If the group will
benefit on average or in the long run from a rule that selectively
ignores past missteps in favor of attention to present and future
willingness to cooperate, then reciprocal systems may sometimes
allo w more flexibility than an unbending adherence to the logic of
choice and chance would require .
How might "second chances" and "fresh starts" work within a
system of conditional reciprocity? Such a system will be largely
forward-looking. 45 It will take each person as it finds themwhich will mean, at times, that their capacity for self-support will
be diminished by irresponsible past choices. It will recognize an
obligation to help each person achieve a decent standard of living,
but only if the individual shows a willingness to discharge her
43

See, e.g., Robert Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare 11 215 ( 1986) (noting that, in an "ex tended pri soner's dilemma" scenario, a stable equili brium res ulting from continuing dealing between parties can sometimes be reached even
in the presence of occasional mi staken defecti on behavior by the game ' s parti cipants).
4 4 See Wax, supra note 2, at 265 (describin g Robert Sugden's Tl strategy associated
with hi s mutu al aid game).
45 A purel y forward-looking system al so has the distin ct advantage of reli e ving those
in charge of administration of the cumbersome and inherentl y error-ridden task of determining the precise nature of past circumstances leading to present predi caments.
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duties on an ongoing basis. So, if a person finds herself unemployed because out -of-wedlock motherhood has led her to drop
out of school, society will not wash its hands of her. But neither
will the duty to help be absolute. Rather, it will be made to depend
on a willingness to behave in a responsible manner from here on
in. This includes , at a minimum, the willingness to undertake substantial se lf-help efforts while assistance is provided. It may even
include a willingness to refrain from bearing more children while
receiving public assistance, although this demand may sometimes
be attenuated by a consensus that parents who work are entitled to
social resources to make up the difference between what they can
earn and what they need. The scenario of repeated childbearing
out of wedlock raises the question, under a forgiveness rule, of
how many past mistakes, resulting in diminished capacity, societies are bound to overlook. There is probably no definitive answer
to that question: different societies must decide that case by case,
with the determination once again informed by conventional understandings and dominant practices. In general, however, those
with inabilities and disabilities for which they are entirely blameless will advance the least problematic claims. The strict rule that
need mu st be clue to bad luck may at times be suspended, because
a society may choose to overlook past irresponsibility in favor of
encouraging ongoing cooperative conduct in the future . And societies may forgive repeated misfeasance up to a point, with the
tendency to run out of patience as infractions accumulate.
To sum up: any political collective committed to redistributing
resources according to reciprocal ideals must strive to accept a
number of basic understandings about how such a system will
function. First, the government cannot run welfare programs without making numerous convention-based judgments and without
setting benchmarks that are inevitably grounded in how most ordinary people are expected to behave and how they do behave. One
convention that will likely be honored, either for individuals or
kinship units, is the expectation of economic self-sufficiency. In
other words, self-sufficiency will be publicly recognized and embraced as a normative ideal from which adult individuals are allowed to deviate only for good cause. Second, although some degree of moral hazard is inevitable, the system should be designed
to minimize it. The rules should be directed at reducing the temptation to exert less than reasonable efforts to contribute to the so-
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cial product. Third, although some initially disadvantaged persons
will exceed reasonable expectations by dint of exceedingly hard
work, that standard should not govern for all. The temptation to
require heroic efforts should be resisted as an unrealistic counsel
of perfection, especially in light of the trend towards greater family fragmentation in society overall. 46 Fourth, it must be assumed
that the paid economy fails to provide a "living wage" for some
number of those who work reasonably hard. Fifth, full-time yearround work should be regarded as a "reasonable effort" for most,
but something short of that should be the standard, at least initially, for those who are so unskilled or inexperienced that they
have chronic difficulties obtaining and holding a job. Sixth, parenthood (especially when children are young) should warrant
some reduction in the amount of labor market effort that suffices
to establish an entitlement to assistance, and account should be
taken of parents' special difficulty in holding jobs that require long
and irregular hours and sudden changes in schedule. Seventh,
workers should never receive less help and fewer privileges than
non-workers and should sometimes receive more, unless the nonworkers in question are so disabled that the expectation of employment of any kind is simply unrealistic. Finally, the government must acknowledge that the need for help will not be all or
nothing. Partial public support may often be appropriate. Indeed,
partial supplementation and assistance will more often be the rule
than the exception. A paradigm committed to providing a social
minimum conditioned on an obligation to contribute productively
must necessarily recognize quite diverse differences in individual
ability to generate adequate income through reasonable efforts under existing economic conditions. Not only will capacities and circumstances vary widely, but fluctuations in labor market opportunities will continually determine how much individuals can
46

Lawrence Mead notes the successes of some recent immigrant groups, whose family members work long hours, and engage in prolonged self-sacrifice, and achieve a high
degree of family cooperation and stability. See Lawrence M. Mead, The New Politics of
Poverty: The Nonworking Poor in America 147-48 (1992). This model of hard work and
family cohesion is very appealing, and it can be argued that failing to accept this model
as the norm encourages the family breakdown and dissension that plagues less successful
groups. Nonetheless, the fact remains that this is probably too strenuous an aspiration for
many of the non-immigrant disadvantaged. Welfare programs need to take some realistic
account of the needs of fragile families and single parent families that now predominate
among the poor, while still finding ways to encourage greater family stability and loyalty.
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contribute to their own sustenance. This implies that policies
should be directed at creating programs that allow the government
so me fl ex ibility in making up the shortfall between what people
can do for themselves and what they need to survive in reasonable
dignity.
V. APPLYING THE CONDITIONAL RECIPROCITY
PARADIGM TO WELFARE REFORM
Given these basic understandings, the challenge is to create
programs that permit the government to fill the gap between what
people in different circumstances can reasonably do for themselves and what they need to live decently. Work expectations and
work requirements are the obvious centerpiece. But a wide variety
of "work supports" should surround these. Work supports can include in-kind assistance or benefits, tax relief, wage subsidies, and
programs to help recipients obtain, retain, and cope with employment.
Perhaps the two most important forms of in-kind assistance are
medical care and childcare. For decades , efforts to move significant numbers of people from welfare to work were hobbled by
disincentives created by the loss of medical and child care assistance, which were sometimes made available on more generous
terms to wholly dependent welfare recipients than to the working
poor. 47 The inversion of that order of support-as it would operate
in conjunction with strictly enforced work requirements-should
be made a feature of any welfare system grounded in reciprocal
ideals. Although eligibility for Medicaid has been expanded recently to cover some of the working poor, 48 many workers on the
lower rungs of the employment ladder lack adequate medical
benefits. 49 The solution to this problem is not obvious because pri47

See Jeff Dickerson, Gradual Welfare R eform; Take Cliffs Out of the Road to Independence ; Atlanta J. & Const., Dec. 3, 1996, at 14A. See al so Richard Wertheimer,
Working Poor Families with Children: Leaving We lfare Doesn't Necessarily M ean
Leaving Poverty, Child Trends Research Brie f (May 2001 )(noting that in 1998, 70 percent of children in working poor families had health insurance, but 77 perce nt of children
in poor families not meeting work requirements had health insurance) .
4 8 See Dan Morgan, Expanded Medical Safety Net Still Has Holes, Wash. Post, Feb.
2 1994, at AI.
4 9 See David Brown, Percentage of Uninsured Dropped in 1999; Critics Say Gains in
Coverage Smaller Than Hoped For in Booming Economy, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2000, at
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vate medical insurance is tied to employment. Employers are not
required to cover many low-wage or part-time workers, and some
who are offered insuranc e cannot afford it. 5° Creating a smooth
interface between government-mandated insurance sc hemes for
low-wage workers and existing private insurance for better-off
wo rkers is often difficult because "notch" effects and phase-outs
create perverse incentives.5 1 A comprehensive recasting of the
medical care system as a whole may be necessary in the long run.
But the economics of health insurance suggests that subsidized
medical benefits will be a key part of any effective sc heme of
·'supported work."
Another important aspect of supported work is childcare for
the working poor. Because most low-skilled mothers of young
children cannot keep jobs without some kind of childcare assistance, welfare reform inevitably pushes government into the childcare business. The welfare reform statute makes some provisions,
throu gh a patchwork of programs and funding methods , for the
care of the children of workers who might otherwise be on welfare .52 But implementation has been slow and many of the funds
go unused for lack of initiative, know-how , or adequate supply. 53
The idea of a greatly expanded, comprehensive national program directed at upgrading care for the children of low-wage
workers fits well with the goals of a welfare system grounded in a
robust notion of reciprocal obligation. More broadly, a commitment to improving the quality of care that poor children receive
comports with popular attitudes about the deserving and undeserving poor. Although assisting the able- bodied offends our sense
of justice, so does indifference to those who suffer through no
50

See Peter T. Kilborn , Unin sured in U .S. Span Many Groups, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26,
1999,atA1.
51
See Dani el Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 405 , 405-11 , 425-26 (1997) (concluding that
income phaseouts of welfare programs are irrational due to their creation of high marginal rates in low-income brackets).
) 2 See Center for Law & Soc. Policy, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
Block Grant, 4 Georgetown 1. on Fighting Poverty, 311, 312-13 ( 1997).
53 See Carla Rivera, After-School Plan Gets Mixed Reviews; Care: Ambitious, Free
Program is Touted as 'Much More Than Baby-sitting.' Critics Say It's Taking Too Long
to Impl e ment, L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 2000, at B2 ; Tom Zoellner, Misuse of Day Care
Fund s Denied; S.F. Offici als Defend Deci sion to Send Money Back to Government, S.F.
Chron. , Mar. 16, 2000, at A21.
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fault of their own. Children of the poor are not responsible for
their dilemma: although adults can be undeserving, children inherently cannot be. By insisting that most mothers work, we honor
the conviction that persons should try to support themselves before
calling upon public help. But by devoting resources to the children
of the poor, we recognize our duty to those who cannot be expected to come to their own aid. Indeed, welfare reform offers a
golden opportunity for our society to advance two w011hy goals
simultaneously: encouraging poor mothers to work, and dramatically improving the quality of the care that blamelessly poor children receive.
A recent study by researchers at Yale and the University of
California at Berkeley reveals that nearly one million toddlers
have been placed in daycare in the wake of welfare reform as single mothers move off welfare and into the workforce. 54 Unfortunately, the quality of the childcare these children receive is abysmal. 55 Many small children spend countless hours in front of the
TV or wandering aimlessly with little adult contact or supervision. 56 Although these daycare experiences may not differ much
from life at home with mom-and thus may not exacerbate welldocumented deficits in schoo 1 readiness that plague this underprivileged population-they certainly do little to improve the
situation. Because, as noted, children can never be "undeserving,"
efforts to improve the care they might otherwise get as an adjunct
to enabling parents to satisfy their debt to the collective need not
fly in the face of fairness concerns or principles of equity. For this
reason, a massive national commitment to better childcare for
children of workers with modest earning power is not an illogical
next step in the progress of welfare reform.
To be sure, the issue of public help for poor children has never
been free of complications. Because generosity to disadvantaged
children inevitably benefits parents-including parents whose imprudent choices have contributed to the disadvantage-generous
assistance for poor children will never square perfectly with holding parents to responsible standards of conduct. In addition, free
See Tamar Lewin, Study Finds Welfare Changes Lead a Million Into Child Care,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2000, at Al7.
55 See id.
56 See id.

54
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childcare for the poorest workers can be regarded as unfair to
working parents who are not much better off. Unless a program is
made universal up and down the income scale, "phase-outs" that
create disincentives and unfairness as between persons very similarly situated will never completely disappear. But providing better childcare services in conjunction with enforcing work requirements under welfare reform at least softens the potential
inequities. Everyone who receives assistance is, by definition, a
wage earner who cannot otherwise make ends meet. And programs
could gradually be expanded to assist as many wage earners as
possible, regardless of welfare history.
Any massive new public childcare effort must confront the
many practical obstacles that stand in the way of delivering high
quality childcare to poor children. The initiative would require
states to enter a new and unfamiliar policy arena. Existing private
and public services are inadequate, and governments in the United
States have little experience with funding, supervising or running
daycare programs on a widespread scale. State welfare bureaucracies must effectively manage federal funds and Congress must
continue to appropriate enough money to do the job. Officials
must make hard tradeoffs between enforcing high standards and
maintaining a diverse and broad supply of care. Some effort
should probably be made to wean poor parents from their attachment to "family" daycare-that is, childcare provided by untrained
family or friends-which studies have shown to be inferior to care
in well-run group centers. 57 Alternatively, officials should explore
ways to upgrade the most popular family care settings without
being overly intrusive. Finally, the public must not expect too
much. Rather, it must recognize that better non-parental care for
young children is not a panacea and that even an expensive initiative may not give poor children the start their middle and upper
class counterparts receive. All of these are formidable challenges,
but they can be met if there is a will.
One common objection to a generous expansion of childcare
programs for workers is that, by effectively subsidizing paid but
not domestic unpaid employment, it encourages both parents in
57

See Ann Crittenden, The Price of Motherhood : Wh y the Most Important Job in the
World is Still the Least Valued 213-14 (2001) ; Loi s W. Hoffman & Lise M. Youngblade, Mothers at Work: Effects on Children's Well-Bein g 268-69 (1999).

2001]

A ReciprocaL WeLfare Program

505

two parent families to enter the workforce and favors working parents over traditional breadwinner/homemaker families. Also, it
may foster single-parenthood by pledging the government to make
that model economically viable. The first objection suffers from
the apparent tension between the background assumption that single mothers will enter the workforce and the desire to encourage
married mothers to stay home. But even if those stances are not as
irreconcilable as they seem,58 this ground for objecting to generous
daycare funding is disingenuous in light of the inadequacy of
wages for many male workers without a college education. 59 Because it is almost impossible for families in this category to support themselves with one earner, family self-sufficiency and traditional family roles often cannot be reconciled in practice. To be
sure, this assumes that the cost of providing child care subsidies to
two-worker families will be less than the cost of supporting singlebreadwinner families, which may not always be the case where the
wife's earning power is low. But it is reasonable to expect that
overall costs to the government will be minimized by providing
childcare assistance to working families, since most families with
two or more workers will need less public support than those with
only one earner even when the costs of childcare subsidies are
taken into account.
As to the charge of encouraging single-motherhood, it is important to recall that the commitment to support of single-parent
families under the welfare reform model comes with significant
strings attached in the form of a substantial paid work requirement.60 As any parent knows, that is a tough row to hoe, and one
58 It might make sense to favor single mothers working full time and married mothers
working only part-time or staying home on the theory that the latter will ordinarily have
husbands who can supply income which, even if not completely adequate, will significantly mitigate the family' s dependence on the government. Single mothers will have no
other source of income. On this view, parental time with children, although highly desi rable, is not the first priority: economic self-sufficiency for the family unit is. Once that
goal is satisfied, then the argument is that families should treat personal care for children
as more desirable than the pursuit of additional income.
59 See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Big Increase in Workers Living Below Poverty Line,
Houston Chron., Mar. 31 , 1994, at A 16 (noting that a disproportionate number of young
workers and those lacking college degrees received wages placing them below the poverty level).
60 See Dan Bloom, After AFDC: Welfare-to-Work Choices and Challenges for States
29 (1997) (noting that single parents with children under the age of six must currently
engage in work activitie s for at least twenty hours per week).
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that is significantly less attractive than the option many pre-reform
recipient s expected, which was to function as a full-time mother at
public expense. The notion that a government firmly committed to
a reciprocal welfare system is making things "easy" for single
mothers is strained at bes t, since those mothers must now confront
the formidable logistics of holding down a job while arranging for
childcare and transportation and enduring the anxiety of separation
from their c hildren for many hours each day. The challenges single mothers face in discharging their obligations place a built-in
limit on the moral hazard traditionally associated with governmental support for single parents under the now defunct AFDC
program. These requirements cannot be said to offer much encou ragement to would-be single parents, although future demographic
trends in out-of-wedlock childbearing must be the ultimate test of
this proposition.
Other programs that fit in with a reciprocal paradigm for welfare policy include work-related income supports and tax breaks .
Edmund Phelps, for example, has recently put forward a proposal
for subsidizing wages of full-time workers whose incomes fall
below a generous subsistence minimum. 61 He proposes this program as an alternative to the minimum wage, which he believes
harms the least skilled workers by pricing them out of the labor
market. 62 Phelps thinks the government should commit itself to
making up the difference between the market wage unskilled
workers can command and some reasonable "living wage," with a
sliding scale of supplements to minimize the perverse effect on
wage levels that such a subsidy would be expected to create.63
Although wage subsidy programs like these are cumbersome to
administer and are plagued with formidable practical difficulties,64
they might nonetheless have some positive effect of signaling a
willingness to make good on the promise that lies at the heart of a
commitment to reciprocity in social welfare: that of guaranteeing a
reasonable share of resources in exchange for a substantial work
Edmund S. Phelps, Rewarding Work: How to Restore Participation and SelfSupport to Free Enterprise 105-06 (1997).
62 Id. at 146.
63 See id at I 12- 13.
64 See generally Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidi es, 108 Yale L.J. 967 (1999) (arguing that employment subsidies are
plagued with problems which make them less desirable than an unconditional cash grant
program).
6l
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effort. 65
Likewise, the recent expansion of the Earned Income Tax
Credit ("EITC") is also in keeping with this commitment. The
EITC program provides graduated refundable tax credits to workers. Benefits increase as earnings climb up to a level o f income
that is roughly $ 11 ,000 yearly, depending on family composition,
and then gradually phase out. 66 Although the EITC program is not
without problems- the phase-out discourages work and the marriage penalty is severe-the offer of refundable tax credits (which
effectively operate as an income supplement for many familie s)
only to those who participate in the paid workforc e once again
represents a practical commitment to ensuring a minimally decent
standard of living for those making a positive effort towards se lfsufficiency.
Finally, welfare reform has made possible the creation of a
number of "work-enabling" programs that are designed to aid
former welfare recipients in their efforts to find and hold jobs. 67
For example, under the t1exible block grant structure of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, some states have
used federal funds for short-term emergency loan s and for assistance in purchasing and maintaining commuter automobiles. 6S Because many jobs are not located close to poor neighborhoods and
public transportation is often sporadic and unreliable , a private car
can make the difference between success and failure in the job

65 Phelps proposes ex tending the supplement only to full-time workers, mainly to
minimi ze the expected income effect of the supplement, which may cause some persons
to work fewer hours. Phelps, supra note 60, at I 08. Argu ably, however, this restiiction is
hard on those who choose to or are only able to work part-time, especi all y single mothers
and women who function as second-earners. But it might be possible to modify the proposal to include more part-time workers under selected circumstances-for exampl e,
where there is only one adult in the family, or where one adult is already working fulltime.
66 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of TaxBased Welfare Reform, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 533, 541 (1995).
67 See Bloom, supra note 59, at 40-50 (discussing programs aimed at helping welfare
recipi ents secure employment and/or develop educational or occupati onal skills necessary to garner higher-wage j obs) .
68 See, e.g., Alice Reid, On the Road From Welfare to Work; Pairi ng Clients and Cars,
Fairfax Puts Jobs Within Reach, Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1999, at AI (describing local programs design ed to allow low-income workers to seek jobs in are as not se rved by rel iabl e
publi c transportation by providing these indi viduals with cars at low o r no cost).
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market.69 For those who have demonstrated willingness to help
the mselves by seeking and performing work, providing money to
purchase transportation fits well with reciprocal ideals.
Although a full discussion cannot be undertaken here, other
approaches that would square with an emphasis on reciprocal obligations might include: (1) giving low income workers priority in
qualifying for public housing aid, daycare slots, and enrichment
programs for children; (2) increasing the size of dependent or
child-care credits for working families ; (3) creating public "lastresort" jobs for those who repeatedly fail to obtain or hold onto
jobs available in the private market; (4) providing subsidies for job
training; and (5) continuing to provide public support to those pursuing education beyond high school. Some of these programs are
controversial, are difficult to implement fairly and effectively, 70 or
have been de-emphasized under the current federal scheme. 71 But
the broad-based political support that reciprocally responsible
69 See id.
70
On public works programs and "workfa re" type jobs, see, e .g., Matthew Dill er,
Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfa re: Work Progra ms
Are Deliberately Structured So That They Are Virtually Never Comparable to Holding
an Actu al Job, 9 Stan. L. & P ol'y Rev. 19, 25-32 (1998) (arguing that workfare is not
equivalent to a job, given that workfare participants receive fewer social benefits and
legal protection s than non-welfare employees) ; Mickey Kau s, The End of Equality 13235 ( 1992) (noting that, while it would be ineffici e nt to place some welfare recipients on
public works jobs, "at least the public would be getting something for its money.").
71
Under welfare reform, states are not allowed to consider uni versity attendance as
fulfilling work require me nts, although they are not barred from assisting unive rsity students with their own funds. See Bloom, supra note 59, at 115 . Permitting persons to remain on welfare while attending university may seem unfair to individuals who work to
pay their own way through school.
Although the justice of government provi sion of fundin g for training poorly skilled
workers is often urged, see Dworkin, supra note 41, at 320-5 1, previou s effort s to provide training have not borne much fruit. For a critique of the effectiveness of governme nt-sponsored training programs, see James J. Heckman, Is Job Training Oversold?,
Pub. Int. , Spring 1994, at 111-14 (suggesting that it would be either impossible or prohibitively expensive for the government to provide sufficient training to pull most people
out of poverty). See also Michael Grunwald, Welfare-to-Work Isn't Cheap: How She
Got a Job, Am. Prospect, July-Aug. 1997, at 26 (noting that in the face of the limited
success of job training programs, "[t]he prevailing attitude of. . .mos t state-level welfare
reforms . .. is 'work first. "'); Kay SHymowitz, At Last, a Job Program That Works, City
J ., Winter 1997, at 32 (noting that the "giant carcasses of failed federal programs like
CETA, the Manpower Development and Training Act, the Job Corps, and . . .JOBS , litter the landscape.") ; Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obli gations of
Citizenship 148-56 (1986) (noting that the primary problem with the Work Incentive
program was that the program's offices failed to make clear their expectation that its cl ients actuall y work).
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structures often generate may provide the momentum for adding
some of these programs in future rounds of welfare reform.
Moreover, the devolved structure of welfare reform offers the possibility of experimenting with new and creative approaches on a
limited scale at the local level. Localism and devolution fit well
with the understanding of social welfare as a reciprocal project
that joins government and the disadvantaged in a productive partnership, since that project may best be realized through a flexible
patchwork of programs that respond to varying individual circumstances. The period leading up to welfare reform has helped both
recipients and governments understand that a rigid, one-size-fitsall approach to poor relief may not work as well as one that can
take into account market vicissitudes and individual needs. Those
insights should continue to be extended by ongoing experimentation under the flexible mandate that welfare reform makes possible.
Finally, it is important to step back from specific proposals to
consider some broader questions that naturally arise from an emphasis on reciprocity as a principle that should guide redistribution. Should not the design of all redistributive programs, and not
just those targeted to the poor, be scrutinized in light of this idea?
Specifically, the logic of reciprocal obligation may force a rethinking of how our society responds to the problem of disability
and how our approach to disability might be made more consistent
with our treatment of the non-disabled poor.
VI. THE MEDICALLY DISABLED VS. THE "LOW-ABILITY"
POOR
As already noted, central to the concept of reciprocation is the
idea that society should commit to bringing all individuals up to a
baseline level of well- being, provided they work reasonably hard.
But in light of differences in skills and circumstances and the
variation in ability to meet labor market demand, the degree of
help needed to achieve minimum well-being will vary from person
to person. Once again, the population will not neatly divide into
those who should get global support and those who should not.
Rather, we would expect to see a sliding scale of assistance, tailored to each person's capacity to generate resources through reasonable exertions.
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But on this view, there appears to be no reason to adopt radically different policies towards those who meet the conventional
medical criteria of "disability" and tho se who do poorly in the labor market for other reasons. What both groups have in common is
so me degree of deficit in the sk ills or abilities that e mployers
value and the market rewards. More specifically, there is no principled basis for distinguishing sharply between medical disabilities
on the one hand, and inability or low ability on the other, as the
so urce of the failure of a person 's reasonable effort s to yield
enough to attain economic self-sufficiency. To be sure, the common se nse intuition is that conventional disabilities result principally from bad luck. In mo st cases (although not all), affliction
with a disabling condition is not something a perso n has brought
upon himself. Moreover, to the extent that medical disability is
generally considered to be outside a person 's control, the moral
hazard that attends disability is assumed to be less than that for the
kind of "inability" or "low ability" that makes it hard to find and
hold jobs. Most people will not inflict an unpleasant physical or
mental limitation on themselves as the price for public support.
Poor skills, on the other hand, seem more amenable to correction
through self-development. This applies not just to the skills that
depend most directly on intellectual firepower, (the "hard skills"
of technical expertise and job-related know-how) but even more so
to the "soft skills" that seem to matter most to employers (such as
punctuality, reliability, appearance, good manners and a positive
attitude).7 2
Yet leaving aside past failures of self-development, the fact
remains that some workers find themselves unable to meet employers' expectations for available jobs despite a strong desire to
work and what appear to be good faith efforts to secure and retain
employment. And many of the jobs that the least skilled workers
can hold down do not pay enough to maintain self-sufficiency or

72

See Philip Moss & Chris Tilly, Stories Employers Tell : Race, Skill, and Hiring in
America 44, 58-68 (2001).
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support a family. 73 Although persons who work at such jobs are in
some sense employable and emplo yed, they are not economically
independent. They need public help to keep body and soul together. Given the background economic conditions that all workers face , it is not inaccurate to say that these workers, although
seemingly "able-bodied," are the victims of an involuntary or unlucky inability or lack of ability to perform well enough to obviate
the need for public assistance.
But this analysis begs the ques tion of how this group is different from the category of persons classified as "medically disabled"- a category that is excused from working altogetherJ4
The technical definition of an excusable disability in federal law
today requires that a perso n be afflicted with a medical condition
that prevents him from performing any job that exists in the economy. 75 But in practice disability programs so metimes award benefits to persons who could hold down some kind of job. 76 Moreover, our system a voids administrative complexity by failing to
recognize the category of partial disability, which leads to some
over-inclusiveness. But perhaps the important point about policies
towards the disabled is that disability benefits programs as currently structured are oblivious to the possibilities suggested by a
different federal enactment that deals with disabled workers: the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")J 7 That statute requires
employers to refrain from discriminating against disabled persons
by offering them reasonable accommodations on the job-which
means accommodations that do not place an undue financial burden on employers. 78 But that requirement contemplates that many
disabled persons can work productively. Although they cannot
73

See Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet: How Singl e Mothers Survive
Welfare and Low-Wage Work, 228-29 (1 997); Christopher Jencks, Rethinking Social
Poli cy: Race, Poverty, and the Underclass, 205-07 (1 992) (noting that a study of the Illinois welfare system found that, unles s most welfare mothers lived in subsidi zed housing,
their income earned from employment barely paid rent and utility bills) .
74 See Supplemental Security Income (SSI) , 42 USCS § 1381 (2000); Federal OldAfe, Survivors, & Disability Insurance Benefits (OASDI), 42 USDS § 402 (2000).
7
See supra note 73.
7 6 For example, the regul ations under the OADSI and S~I programs contain li stings of
conditions for which persons are considered disabled per se. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(a),
416.9 ll(a)(l) (2001).
77 42 u.s.c. § 12101-12213 (2000).
7 8 See Michael Faillace, Disability Law Deskbook: The Americans with Di sabiliti es
Act in the Workplace 4-4 (2000).
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perform the precise jobs offered in the labor market without so me
modification or restructuring, they can produce net economic
value if employers make changes to meet their special needs. But
that insight just raises the issue of why many of the disabled
should not just be entitled to, but also should be expected to, work
under tho se conditions. Which in turn gives rise to the question of
which alternative comports best with reciprocity principles: excusing persons with physical impairments from working altogether
because they cannot perform existing jobs as well as other people
or striving to engage as many people as reasonably possible in
productive activities regardless of degree of ability or disability by
making some changes to the work that they do. The latter would
appear to comport better with the baseline expectation that everyone exert reasonable efforts towards self-sufficiency by striving to
contribute something to his own support. The ADA seems to embody the assumption that under the right circumstances many persons who are not fully "able-bodied"-all except the most severely afflicted-can exert such an effort to good effect.
The centrality of reciprocity suggests the following principle:
that society ought to expect virtually every mature adult, regardless of ability, to contribute productively to his own upkeep and to
the social product, but that this obligation carries the corresponding duty on the part of society both to secure the opportunity to
make that contribution and to make up for any shortfall in selfsufficiency. The baseline assumption on which this principle operates is that many individuals with "disabilities" and low ability can
contribute something positive, however modest. We ought to expect and facilitate those efforts. Perhaps we should move towards
a scheme in which "supported work" is the rule rather than the exception for all persons who, despite reasonable efforts, are unable
to support themselves regardless of the reason for that shortfall. In
all cases, the need for assistance stems from essentially the same
cause: a mismatch of the attributes of persons and the demands of
the economy. Yet such a mismatch does not relieve the ablebodied poor of the obligation to make reasonable efforts. Why
should it relieve the conventionally disabled? As the political scientist Stuart White has suggested, the reciprocity norm would appear to dictate "[u]niversal enforcement of the minimum standard
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of productive participation." 79 According to White, this means
that:
If we are going to insist that any one citizen satisfies reciprocity-based obligations in return for assurance of a minimum standard of living, than fairness
requires that we apply the same logic to all citizens (or
all productively capable citizens). It is patently unfair
if I have to contribute for my living while you, no less
productively capable than I, do not. SO

A reciprocal social welfare policy would thus seem to dictate
not only that all persons regardless of productive capacity exert
some effort towards their own support, but also that all failures to
achieve self-sufficiency despite reasonable good faith efforts
should be treated alike. A unified approach provides no obvious
basis for distinguishing between those with medically recognized
physical and mental impairments and those who, through lack of
intelligence or other personal attributes, are unable to obtain or
perform jobs that provide economic independence. On this view, a
wide range of disabilities and inabilities would trigger supplementation of some kind, provided that the beneficiary "does his
part" as best he can. Once again, this approach is most consistent
with the recognition that the population does not divide neatly into
those who need no assistance (because they are "able-bodied"
enough to earn their own way) and those who need comprehensive
support (because they are "disabled" and thus wholly relieved of
any obligation.) Rather, the population exemplifies a continuum of
greater or lesser abilities, inabilities, and disabilities. Although
those deficits may prevent some from performing or competing for
jobs that are actually offered and others from earning enough to
support themselves and their dependents, they will rarely foreclose
constructive or productive activity of some kind. Reciprocity
norms may well entail some obligation on society's part to meet
these individuals halfway by ensuring that they are offered a reasonable chance to contribute-a chance that the unregulated labor
market may not always provide. The ADA can be viewed as embodying some acknowledgment of a public obligation to give disabled persons the opportunity to work, with the caveat of not
79
80

White, supra note 3, at 516.
Id.
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placing too great a burden on employers who bear the brunt of the
costs of accommodation. The suggestion here, however, is that we
ought to go beyond this to acknowledge additional obligations on
both sides. This would entail recognizing that the quid pro quo for
reasonable accommodation is not just the right to work if one
wants to, but also a responsibility to work if one can do so productively. This would extend reciprocal obligations not just to the
"able-bodied" poor but also to many who have conventionally
been regarded as less than able-bodied.
This plea for a unified approach to different sources of disadvantage in competitive labor markets also gives rise to the question of why the duty of "reasonable accommodation" should extend only to the medically disabled. Does society have an
obligation to provide extra work opportunities to those who do
poorly in labor markets for other reasons? Because the work requirements in the Welfare Reform Act are still phasing in, the welfare system does cmTently continue to assist many of the least
skilled who manage to obtain only intermittent employment-a
feature that can perhaps be viewed as one form of "reasonable accommodation." But a more direct accommodation to those who
fail to fit into the paid labor market is the provision in some states
of workfare jobs and government "last resort" employment programs .8 1 Like the ADA's requirement that employers offer a reasonable accommodation to disabled persons who are able to perform most essentials of a job, 82 these workfare programs are based
on the tacit understanding that the economy may not offer everyone an adequate opportunity to discharge a reciprocal obligation to
contribute something to the social product without some special
measures designed to keep them productively at work. 83 In the
case of workfare, the "special measures" are the actual creation of
positions that are tailored to the lesser capacities of those who repeatedly fail on the private job market.
81

Rachel L. Swarns, Ideas and Trend s; A Wakeup Call for Workfare' s Advocates,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1998, §4, at 5 (noting that most welfare program officials view
workfare as a "last resort" because it is costly and often does not lead participants to
placement in real jobs).
82 See Fai !lace, supra note 77.
83 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Life' s Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881 , 1933-35 (2000)
(discussing the conceptual connection between supports for welfare Ieavers and providing work opportunities for the di sabled).
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The discussion also begs the question of how society should
deal with persons at the very bottom of the ladder -persons for
whom the social costs of providing a chance to engage in effortful
activity threatens to exceed any net benefit. There may well be
people who are more expensive to keep at work than to maintain
in idleness. 84 It is one thing for the group to supplement the earnings of a worker who, although not productive enough to support
himself, is able to help defray the costs of his own survival. It is
quite another for society to expend extra resources so that a
worker can be seen to "contribute" to his own support by performing some job, even if making that job available to him results
in a net loss overall. How does the duty of reciprocity play out in
that situation? Certainly the ADA seems to have resolved that
question in favor of idleness for the disabled with room to spare:
employers are not required to spend so much to employ a disabled
person that their business suffers a net loss, even if the job might
generate savings for the taxpaying public (and thus net savings
overall). 85 As a general matter, however, there is no definitive answer to this question for the general run of cases. Rather, the answer is: "It depends." On the one hand, the intuitions behind reciprocity would point to the arbitrariness of relieving persons of any
responsibility to expend "reasonable efforts" based simply on the
bad-or good-fortune of being profoundly unproductive. On the
other hand, our decisions may in part depend on why someone's
efforts yield so little. Pity or sympathy may impel us to excuse
those with severe physical or mental deficiencies on the theory
that they have already "suffered enough." But those whose problems are general incompetence or intransigent bad habits may excite less sympathy-perhaps because they incite the residual suspicion that they are not entirely "blameless" for their own plight or
because they lack the obvious deformities that elicit sympathetic
84

See, e.g., Phelps, s upra note 60, at 157 (discussing the possibility that some workers
of limited talent or disadvantaged background may be either impossible to train or so
expensive to train that net productivity is zero or negative).
85 Cf. 29 U.S.C. §§ 12111(10), 12112(5)(a) (2001) (defining "discriminate" as "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless
such covered e ntity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity," and also defining "undue hardship" as an "ac tion requiring significant difficulty or expense" in light of certain
enumerated factors, including the cost of such an action and the financial resources of
the employer).
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emotions. In any case, soCietles must make some decision about
how to deal with this category of persons by determining whether
considerations of cost and efficiency outweigh the values of consistency and equity or vice versa.
VII. CONCLUSION
This essay has attempted to show that a welfare system motivated by overarching principles of social reciprocity would share
some of the features that have already been incorporated into our
system through recent reform and through longstanding practice,
and would also add or expand some programs and introduce additional elements into the scheme. A system that assists and gives
special privileges to workers but takes steps to ensure that the
maximum number of willing persons can claim a place among the
ranks of workers, best accords with that reciprocal ideal. There is
no one set of measures that perfectly realizes this concept; many
options are available and some may work better than others depending on the circumstances. Ultimately, experience must be the
guide to the most effective implementation of reciprocal ideals.

